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‘Calling ISIL Atrocities Against the Yezidis by their Rightful Name’:  
Do they Constitute the Crime of Genocide?  
 




In March 2016, both the US House of Representatives and Secretary of State John 
Kerry designated the alleged crimes committed by ISIL against, inter alia, the 
Yezidis, a small religious minority in Iraq and Syria, as ‘genocide.’ This article 
examines the evidence for this designation as emerges from various human rights 
reports and other publicly available sources, to assess whether ISIL’s actions against 
the Yezidis may be legally characterized as the crime of genocide. The article finds 
that, while ISIL’s actions against the Yezidis in Iraq and Syria may constitute the 
underlying acts of the crime of genocide, on the basis of information currently 
available in the public domain, it is not possible to reach a view on whether 
individuals perpetrators had the dolus specialis necessary to commit the crime of 
genocide. The article, however, outlines a pattern of conduct which could indicate a 
genocidal plan. 
 





When members of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (‘ISIL’)1 attacked the area of 
Jabal Sinjar in northern Iraq, in August 2014,2 they brought to ‘the world’s attention a 
little-known people’:3 the Yezidis. In response to this attack, Vian Dakhil, a Yezidi member 
of the Iraqi Parliament, delivered an impassioned appeal for assistance, asserting that ‘we 
are being slaughtered under the banner “there is no god but Allah”…There is now a 
campaign of genocide being waged on the Yezidi constituent.’4 Almost one and a half years 
later, the US House of Representatives unanimously adopted Res. 75 which resolved that 
the atrocities perpetrated by ISIL against Christians, Yezidis, and other religious and ethnic 
                                                 
 
* Member of the Iraqi Council of Representatives. 
** Senior Lecturer and Faculty Director of Research Students, Anglia Ruskin University 
(aldo.zammitborda@anglia.ac.uk). 
*** Senior Lecturer, Anglia Ruskin University (alexander.murray@anglia.ac.uk). 
1 The organisation known as ISIL has ‘renamed and rebranded itself multiple times. It is known as the Islamic 
State (its most recent self-appellation), but it is also frequently referred to as the Islamic State in Iraq and the 
Levant (ISIL) or Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS), or as Daesh, a derogatory term extracted from its 
Arabic acronym’: Stern and Berger, ISIS: The State of Terror (2015) 8. For the purposes of this article, the 
acronym ‘ISIL’ is used, as this is also the acronym adopted by the report of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights on the human rights situation in Iraq. UN Human Rights Council, Report of the 
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the human rights situation in Iraq in the 
light of abuses committed by the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and associated groups, Doc. 
A/HRC/28/18, Twenty-eighth session, 13 March 2015 (‘UN Human Rights Council Report March 2015’).  
2 Morris, ‘Islamic State seizes town of Sinjar, pushing out Kurds and sending Yazidis fleeing’ The Washington 
Post, 3 August 2014, available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com (Last accessed 1 June 2016). 
3 Stansfield, ‘The Islamic State, the Kurdistan Region and the future of Iraq: assessing UK policy options’ 
(2014) 90 International Affairs 1329, 1337. See also Cockburn, The Rise of Islamic State: ISIS and the New 
Sunni Revolution (2015) 151. 
4 Dakhil’s intervention has been uploaded to Youtube, ‘Iraqi Yezidi MP Breaks Down in Parliament: ISIL is 





minorities in Iraq and Syria constitute war crimes, crimes against humanity, and 
genocide.5 This resolution stated that: 
 
all governments, including the United States, and international organizations, 
including the United Nations and the Office of the Secretary-General, should call ISIL 
atrocities by their rightful names: war crimes, crimes against humanity, and 
genocide;6  
 
It was the resolution’s claim that ISIL had committed ‘genocide’ which attracted 
particular media attention.7 This claim was reiterated two days later by the US Secretary 
of State, John Kerry, who declared that ‘[m]y purpose in appearing before you today is to 
assert that, in my judgment, [ISIL] is responsible for genocide against groups in areas 
under its control, including Yezidis, Christians, and Shia Muslims.’8  
 
Given  that ‘there is a marked difference between the ordinary, lay meaning of the word 
‘genocide’, or even the concept of genocide in anthropology or other social sciences, and 
the legal concept of genocide,’9 it is pertinent to ask whether ‘genocide’ in the above 
statements was used in its legal meaning. Bearing in mind that the use of this designation 
has, in the past, raised objections and fuelled heated debates,10 this article aims to 
explore, with respect to the alleged atrocities of ISIL against the Yezidi minority in Iraq 
and Syria, whether these may be characterized as the crime of genocide, as this concept 
is understood in human rights and international law. In addition to the profound 
implications such a characterisation has for the victims of these atrocities, as well as for 
the accuracy of the legal-historical record, the genocide designation may also have broader 
implications for laws on freedom of speech, particularly in the context of genocide denial 
laws.11 
 
Schabas observes that crime of genocide may be regarded as a specific category of 
crimes against humanity.12 In this context, as crimes against humanity are generally 
easier to prove than genocide as they do not require the high threshold of specific intent,13 
an important question that needs to be addressed at the outset is whether it matters if 
ISIL’s atrocities are characterized (and prosecuted) as genocide or, otherwise, as crimes 
against humanity. There are sound pragmatic reasons for labelling atrocities as crimes 
against humanity, in order to circumvent the probative difficulties associated with specific 
intent. In this respect, in 2010, a group of legal experts put forward the Crimes Against 
                                                 
 
5 US House of Representatives, H. CON. RES 75 (‘Expressing the sense of Congress that the atrocities 
perpetrated by ISIL against religious and ethnic minorities in Iraq and Syria include war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, and genocide’), 15 March 2016, at para 1. 
6 ibid., at para 2. 
7 See, for instance, Boorstein, ‘The U.S. House just voted unanimously that the Islamic State commits 
‘genocide.’ Now what?’ in The Washington Post, 15 March 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com (Last 
accessed 1 June 2016). 
8 US Secretary of State John Kerry, ‘Remarks on Daesh and Genocide’, Press Briefing Room, Washington, DC, 
17 March 2016, available at: http://www.state.gov/ (Last accessed 1 June 2016) (emphasis added). 
9 Milanovic, ‘State Responsibility for Genocide’ (2006) 17 European Journal of International Law 553 at 556. 
This issue was also discussed in the British House of Commons. When asked  about the labelling of ISIL’s 
actions towards the Yezidi as genocide, the Prime Minister considered that such labels were always ‘done under 
a legal definition, but there is a very strong case here for saying that it is genocide, and I hope that it will be 
portrayed and spoken of as such’: see HC Deb 4 May 2016, vol 609, col 168. 
10 For instance, Sémelin notes that ‘[a]pplying the notion of ‘genocide’ to these very different historical cases 
has raised a number of objections, and continues to fuel the most heated of debates. The problem the term 
poses is an almost inextricable one of taxonomy, stemming from the various and sundry meanings invested in 
this term. Sémelin, Purify and Destroy: The Political Uses of Massacre and Genocide (2013) 309. 
11 See, for instance, Perinçek v Switzerland Application no. 27510/08, Merits, 15 October 2015, at para 196. 
12 Schabas, ‘Punishment of Non-State Actors in Non-International Armed Conflict’ (2002) 26 Fordham 
International Law Journal 907 at 911. 




Humanity Initiative,14 in order to  ‘do away with the need to engage the thorny issue of 
intent.’15 Schabas, for instance, argues that, since the definition of crimes against 
humanity has been expanded to cover atrocities committed both in times of armed conflict 
and peacetime,16 ‘[d]ebating the precise boundaries of genocide with respect to individual 
victims now seems a rather sterile exercise.’17 
 
However, we consider that ‘[g]enocide and crimes against humanity are simply different 
as a matter of international law,’18 not least because the 1948 United Nations Convention 
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (‘UNCG’) places specific legal 
obligations on States to prevent and punish genocide.19 Moreover, we consider that, while 
the crimes against humanity category encompasses horrific crimes, this category on its 
own does not fully and adequately capture the specific moral repulsiveness of genocide. 
In Krstić, the ICTY Appeals Chamber underscored that ‘the crime of genocide is singled 
out for special condemnation and opprobrium. The crime is horrific in its scope; its 
perpetrators identify entire human groups for extinction. Those who devise and implement 
genocide seek to deprive humanity of the manifold richness its nationalities, races, 
ethnicities and religions provide.’20 For these reasons, genocide has been described as the 
‘crime of crimes’21 and has ‘assumed a position at the apex of the hierarchy of international 
crimes.’22  From the above, we consider that it therefore matters significantly whether or 
not ISIL’s actions against the Yezidis may be characterized as the crime of genocide, both 
from the perspective of the victims and for the legal-historical record. 
 
It should be noted that, even though the wording of Res. 75 and Secretary of State 
Kerry’s statement refer to other religious and ethnic minorities, such as Christians, this 
article will focus solely on ISIL’s actions against the Yezidis in the period between June 
2014 and February 2015.23 As one report has found, ‘even within the context of its 
persecution of minority groups and Shi’a Muslims, [ISIL] has singled out the Yezidi 
minority…for particularly brutal treatment.’24 Moreover, the article will focus on ISIL’s 
                                                 
 
14 Whitney Harris World Law Institute, ‘Crimes Against Humanity Initiative’, available at: 
http://law.wustl.edu/harris/crimesagainsthumanity/ (Last accessed 1 June 2016). 
15 Totten, ‘The State and Future of Genocide Studies and Prevention: An Overview and Analysis of Some Key 
Issues’ (2011) 6 Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal 211 at 220. 
16 This was posited in Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic a/k/a ‘Dule’, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory 
Appeal on Jurisdiction, ICTY Appeals Chamber, 2 October 1995, at para 78, and confirmed under Article 7 of the 
Rome Statute of the ICC. On this decision, see Hoffmann, ‘The Gentle Humanizer of Humanitarian Law: Cassese 
and the Creation of the Customary Law of Non-International Armed Conflicts’ in Stahn and van den Herik (eds.) 
Future Perspectives on International Criminal Justice (2010) 80. 
17 William Schabas, LJIL Symposium: A Comment on Ambrus, Opinio Juris, available at: 
http://opiniojuris.org/2012/12/20/ljil-symposium-a-comment-on-ambrus/ (Last accessed 1 June 2016). 
18 Milanovic, supra n 9 at 558. The contextual elements required for genocide and crimes against humanity are 
also different. See Kreß, ‘The Crime of Genocide and Contextual Elements: A Comment on the ICC Pre-Trial 
Chamber's Decision in the Al Bashir Case’ (2009) 7 Journal of International Criminal Justice 297 at 297. 
19 Article 1 of the UNCG. 
20 The Chamber held that ‘This is a crime against all of humankind, its harm being felt not only by the group 
targeted for destruction, but by all of humanity’: see Prosecutor v Radislav Krstić IT-98-33-A, Judgment, ICTY 
Appeals Chamber, 19 April 2004, at para 36 (emphasis added). 
21 Prosecutor v Kambanda 97-23-S, Judgment, ICTR Trial Chamber, 4 September 1998, at para 16; See also 
Prosecutor vs Serushago 98-39-S, Judgment, ICTR Trial Chamber, 5 February 1999, at para 15. 
22 Dixon and Khan , Archbold on International Criminal Courts: Practice, Procedure and Evidence, 3rd ed. (2009) 
1078 (at para 13-6). It has also been noted that genocide has ‘unmatched rhetorical power’: see Albright and 
Cohen, Preventing Genocide: A Blueprint for U.S. Policymakers (2008) xxi. 
23 The sources we had access to generally cover acts allegedly committed in this period. 
24 Amnesty International, ‘Escape from hell: Torture and sexual slavery in Islamic State Captivity in Iraq’, 
2014, Available at <http://www.amnesty.org.uk/sites/default/files/escape_from_hell_-
_torture_and_sexual_slavery_in_islamic_state_captivity_in_iraq_-_english_2.pdf> (Last accessed 1 June 
2016). For instance, a report in the New York Times notes that ‘[t]he Islamic State's sex trade appears to be 
based solely on enslaving women and girls from the Yazidi minority. As yet, there has been no widespread 
campaign aimed at enslaving women from other religious minorities’: Callimachi, ‘ISIS Enshrines a Theology of 




actions and will not examine the acts of other armed groups in the region,25 which would 
require a separate focus.  
 
Gathering information on ISIL’s activities, given the ‘ongoing conflict and lack of access 
to key areas,’26 remains challenging.27 We have used data from three main sources in the 
public domain: (1) reports of the UN and its agencies, as well as of non-governmental 
organisations; (2) ISIL’s own publications; and (3) media reports. In this respect, a key 
source, is the report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (‘UN 
Human Rights Council Report’).28 This report is the outcome of a fact-finding mission in 
Iraq, which conducted interviews with over 100 victims and witnesses.29 This data has 
been supplemented by reports from other sources, including a joint report of the United 
Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq and Office of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Human Rights on the protection of civilians in the armed conflict in Iraq30 and reports 
from non-governmental organisations such as Amnesty International31 and Human Rights 
Watch.32 
 
With respect to ISIL’s own publications, the organisation has kept a visual record of 
many of its atrocities and has disseminated these through social and other media. Indeed, 
it has been noted that, generally, ISIL ‘has not tried to hide or deny its crimes. On the 
contrary, more than any other group, it has gone to great efforts to publicize gruesome 
details of the atrocities perpetrated by its members against captured soldiers and civilians 
alike, giving them ample resonance through videos and statements widely distributed on 
social media, often in multiple languages.’33 ISIL’s own publications, such as Dabiq,34 
constitute another important source of evidence of its actions.35 
 
                                                 
 
25 UN Human Rights Council Report March 2015, supra n 1 at para 50. 
26 US Secretary of State John Kerry, supra n 8. 
27 United Nations Security Council, ‘Letter dated 13 November 2014 from the Chair of the Security Council 
Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al-Qaida and associated 
individuals and entities addressed to the President of the Security Council’, Doc. S/2014/815, 14 November 
2014, at para 5. 
28 UN Human Rights Council Report March 2015, supra n 1. It should be noted that questions have been raised 
about the powers of fact-finding bodies to make determinations on individual criminal responsibility: see 
Labuda, ‘What Lies Beneath the ‘G’ Word? Genocide Labelling And Fact Finding at the UN’ EJIL:Talk! - Blog of 
the European Journal of International Law, 28 May 2015, available at: http://www.ejiltalk.org/ (Last accessed 
1 June 2016); and about the evidentiary thresholds they adopt (ibid.). We do not consider that these important 
questions detract from the factual findings set out in the reports. 
29 UN Human Rights Council Report March 2015, supra n 1 at paras 9-11. In its Methods of Work section, the 
report states ‘[t]he mission reviewed all available information, including testimony from witnesses and victims 
and documentation from the Government of Iraq Member States, and relevant United Nations and non-
governmental organisations. It followed up on reports of violations of international human rights and 
humanitarian law in Iraq to verify their veracity and establish further facts. The mission conducted 
investigations in Chamchamal, Dohuk, Erbil, Kalar, Suleimaniyah, and Zakho and camps for internally displaced 
persons (IDPs) in these areas’: ibid. 
30 United Nations, ‘Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 6 July – 10 September 2014’ 
UN Assistance Mission to Iraq (10 September 2014) available at: http://www.ohchr.org (‘UNAMI Report’). 
31 Amnesty International, supra n 24. 
32 Human Rights Watch, ‘Iraq: ISIS Escapees Describe Systematic Rape’, 14 April 2015, https://www.hrw.org/ 
(Last accessed 1 June 2016). 
33 Amnesty International, supra n 24 at 11. 
34 The magazine is named after the location in Syria where ISIL believes the final battle for the world will be 
fought between Muslims and the Rum (romans/Christians). See online 
http://www.clarionproject.org/news/islamic-state-isis-isil-propaganda-magazine-dabiq (Last accessed 1 June 
2016). 
35 According to a letter from the Chair of the UN Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee, ISIL’s 
‘propaganda…is slick, digital and produced at scale for audiences across the world’: United Nations Security 
Council, ‘Letter dated 13 November 2014 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to 
resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities 
addressed to the President of the Security Council’, Doc. S/2014/815, 14 November 2014, at para 2. See also 
Cockburn, supra n 3 at 127 – 128. However, some videos purporting to show ISIL in action have turned out to 




The article is divided into four sections. The first provides an overview of the Yezidis. 
Parts two and three examine ISIL’s actions in the context of the material and mental 
elements of genocide. The article concludes that, while ISIL’s actions against the Yezidis 
in Iraq and Syria may constitute the underlying acts of the crime of genocide, in view of 
the limitations of our sources and, in particular, the lack of access to information on 
individual perpetrators, we have been unable to reach a view on whether individuals 
perpetrators had the dolus specialis necessary to commit the crime of genocide. 
 
2. WHO ARE THE YEZIDIS? 
 
Although there is a substantial body of research on the Yezidis, particularly by scholars 
who have conducted fieldwork among this minority in Iraq,36 the Yezidis themselves place 
crucial importance on oral tradition, and amongst their many religious taboos, there is a 
traditional ban on literacy.37 Allison notes that ‘[t]hey communicated with their 
neighbours, and passed on their community history, literature, wisdom and religious texts 
to their descendants, orally…These traditions are intimately related to the Yezidis’ 
perception of their own identity.’38 This emphasis on an oral tradition means that the 
available information on the origin and history of Yezidism remains rather vague.39 This 
may, in part, be the reason why this small, ethno-religious minority has become ‘one of 
the more misunderstood groups of the Middle East.’40 
 
The article focuses on the Yezidis in northern Iraq and Syria. While the Yezidis are 
usually regarded as being of Kurdish ethnicity,41 this is a complex question.42 Maisel 
observes that ‘some communities, particularly in Armenia and the Sinjar Mountains, want 
to be regarded as Yezidis - as a distinct ethnicity with their own Yezidi language.’43 Their 
own traditions and myths shed little light on the question of ethnicity.44 Throughout 
history, there have been attempts by non-Yezidis to label them, and attempts by the 
Yezidis themselves to claim specific ethnic identities, usually in connection with 
contemporary political factors. One theory views the Yezidis as descendants from the 
ancient Assyrians.45 Another theory provides for a totally Islamic origin for the Yezidis.46 
And yet another theory, associated with Kurdish nationalism, claims descent from the 
Medes for the Kurds.47 While the question of Yezidi ethnicity is, therefore, contested, the 
                                                 
 
36 See also Allison, The Yezidi Oral Tradition in Iraqi Kurdistan (2001) 3; Açıkyıldız, The Yezidis: The History of 
a Community, Culture and Religion (2010) 1; Harrison (ed), Religious Freedom Issues in Iraq (2010) 1; and 
Maisel, ‘Social Change Amidst Terror and Discrimination: Yezidis in the New Iraq’ The Middle East Institute 
Policy Brief No. 18, August 2008, 1. 
37 Allison, supra n 36 at 3. 
38 ibid. 
39 Açıkyıldız, supra n 36 at 27. 
40 Allison, supra n 36 at 3. As Empson notes, this is rather a misnomer: Empson, The Cult of the Peacock 
Angel: A Short Account of the Yezidi Tribes of Kurdistan (1928) 23. 
41 Maisel, supra n 36 at 1 (fn 1). 
42 Empson, supra n 40 at 24. Anthropologists approach the concept of ethnicity as a ‘social category linking a 
group of people who perceive themselves to share ancestry and identity markers (language, food, dress, 
religion, and so forth). The sense of ancestry is frequently linked to an origin story, which helps provide a 
sense of solidarity and belonging as well as a sense of difference from other ethnic groups. Ethnic categories 
are fluid and multiple…’: Hinton, ‘Critical Genocide Studies’ (2012) 7 Genocide Studies and Prevention: An 
International Journal 4 at 5. 
43 Maisel, supra n 36 at 2. 
44 With the possible exception of the traditions that the Yezidis were the children of Adam alone and not of Eve, 
and thus separate from the rest of humanity: Allison, supra n 36 at  40. 
45 Allison, supra n 36 at 40-41. 
46 ibid. 
47 Allison notes that ‘This eagerness to embrace an ancient Iranian cultural heritage in part reflects a resistance 
to attempts, by pan-Turkists in particular, to deny a separate Kurdish identity. The Medes offer a non-Islamic 
origin distinguishing Kurds from Turks and Arabs. The claim of descent from a people who were not only 
ancient, but powerful enough to have an empire, may be seen as a claim for power in the contemporary world. 




most important factor differentiating Yezidis from other groups is their religion.48 Allison 
notes that: 
 
the Yezidis are a religious minority with many taboos and a strict caste system…The 
Yezidis are neither Muslim, Christian nor Jewish and therefore not ‘People of the 
Book’. This has had important implications in the past for their legal status, and is 
still a factor in their relationships with their neighbours and with authority. Their 
religion contains elements originating in various majority religions, but cannot be 
defined as purely, or even principally, Christian, Islamic or Zaroastrian; it appears 
to be truly syncretistic.49 
 
In the Yezidi religion, power from God is delegated to seven angels and their leader, 
Tawûsî Melek (the ‘Peacock Angel’).50 It is this association with the Peacock Angel that has 
led to the Yezidi being misleadingly described as ‘devil worshippers’.51 The next section 
will explore ISIL’s actions against this ethno-religious group within the framework of Article 
2 of the UNCG. 
 
3. ISIL’S ACTIONS AND THE MATERIAL ELEMENTS OF GENOCIDE 
 
Article 2 of the UNCG provides:52 
 
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with 
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, 
as such: 
 
(a) Killing members of the group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring 
about its physical destruction in whole or in part; 
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 
 
It is widely recognized that ‘the law set out in the Convention reflect[s] customary 
international law and that the norm prohibiting genocide constitutes jus cogens.’53 As the 
Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) noted, in Vasiliauskas, 
all references to the crime of genocide in subsequent international law instruments, 
including the 1998 Statute of the International Criminal Court (‘ICC’), describe that crime 
in similar, if not identical, terms.54 However, as neither Iraq nor Syria are members of the 
ICC, it is the provisions of the UNCG which have to be relied on with respect to ISIL. In 
this context, in view of the progressive development of international law and human rights 
law, through which ‘[n]on-State actors…are increasingly exposed to the threat of 
accountability and punishment for abuses of human rights,’55 we take the view that the 
                                                 
 
48 ibid 42. This is also the view adopted by the Report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, who 
describes the Yezidis as a ‘community whose identity is based on their religious beliefs’: UN Human Rights 
Council Report March 2015, supra n 1 at para 17. 
49 Allison, supra n 36 at 26. 
50 Açıkyıldız, supra n 36 at 73. 
51 ibid., 79; Maisel, supra n 36 at 3. 
52 For more on the UNCG, see Schabas, Genocide in International Law 2nd edn (2009) 3. The UNCG was 
ratified by both Syria (1955) and Iraq (1959), see ICRC, ‘Treaties and State Parties to Such Treaties: 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 December 1948’, 
https://www.icrc.org (Last accessed 1 June 2016). 
53 Prosecutor v Vidoje Blagojević, Dragan Jokić IT-02-60-T, Judgment, ICTY Trial Chamber, 17 January 2005, 
at para 639. 
54 Vasiliauskas v Lithuania, Judgment Application no. 35343/05, Merits, 20 October 2015, at para 170. 




proscription of genocide contained in Article 2 of the UNCG applies ‘equally to State and 
non-State actors,’56 such as ISIL.57 
 
Genocide as defined in Article 2 of the UNCG comprises both material and mental 
elements.58 This section will examine ISIL’s actions in the context of the material elements 




The evidence indicated that ISIL has pursued a campaign of killing targeting minority 
groups including the Yezidi. One report detailed how ISIL fighters have ‘summarily 
executed’ Yezidi men after they had been segregated from the women and children.59 
There were reports that males over the age of 14 had been shot,60 and in at least one 
instance, all males over the age of 10 had been shot.61 In a number of cases, Yezidi men 
were presented by ISIL with the choice of conversion to Islam or death.62 However, in 
some cases, having converted, the Yezidi men were then killed.63 Other reports make 
reference to mass killings performed by ISIL after which any survivors were buried alive.64 
 
ISIL has conducted a campaign of mass killing that has targeted opponents, including 
Sunnis who refused to swear fealty to ISIL65 and those associated with the Iraqi 
government, such as police officers and members of the Iraq military.66 However, it 
appeared from the evidence available that the Yezidis had been the focus of systematic 
searches aimed at ‘hunting down and killing Yezidi who had remained in their homes.’67  
 
In the current context, reliable numbers remain difficult to establish, with some media 
reports placing the figure of Yezidis killed in early August 2014 at approximately 500.68 
Other media reports refer to 2,000 deaths in a single day in August 2014.69 Meanwhile, 
the UN estimated that up until October 2014, ISIL had killed approximately 5,000 Yezidis. 
Subsequent reports refer to additional killings including the murder of 300 Yezidi 
captives.70 The pattern of attacks has occurred throughout the territory controlled by ISIL. 
                                                 
 
56 See Kadic v Karadzic: Opinion of 2nd Circuit re: Subject Matter Jurisdiction, United States Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit, Nos. 1541, 1544, 13 October 1995. 
57 In support of this position, see Kunstle, ‘Kadic v Karadzic: Do private individuals have enforceable rights and 
obligations under the Alien Tort Claims Act?’ (1996) 6 Duke Journal Of Comparative & International Law 319 at 
331 and Nowak and Januszewski, ‘Non-State Actors and Human Rights,’ in Math Noortmann et. al. (eds.), Non-
State Actors in International Law (2015) 121. For a discussion of the use of national court decisions to interpret 
rules of international law, Zammit Borda, ‘A Formal Approach to Article 38(1)(d) of the ICJ Statute from the 
Perspective of the International Criminal Courts and Tribunals’ (2013) 24 European Journal of International 
Law 649 at 658. 
58 See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 2007, 43, at para 186. 
59 UN Human Rights Council Report March 2015, supra n 1 at para 18. 
60 ibid. 
61 UNAMI Report, supra n 30 at 12. 
62 UN Human Rights Council Report March 2015, supra n 1 at para 18; UNAMI Report, supra n 30 at 14. 
63 UN Human Rights Council Report March 2015, supra n 1 at para 18. 
64 Ahmad Rasheed, ‘Exclusive: Iraq says Islamic State killed 500 Yazidis, buried some victims alive’, Reuters, 
10 August 2014. Available at <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/10/us-iraq-security-yazidis-killings-
idUSKBN0GA0FF20140810> (Last accessed 1 June 2016). 
65 UNAMI Report, supra n 30 at 7. 
66 ibid 6-7. 
67 ibid 13. 
68 Milmo and Wright , ‘Iraq crisis: Islamic State militants ‘kill hundreds’ of Yazidi minority as 'women and 
children buried alive', The Independent, 10 August 2014. Available at 
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/iraq-crisis-islamic-state-militants-kill-hundreds-of-
yazidi-minority-as-women-and-children-buried-9660398.html > (Last accessed 1 June 2016).  
69 Levs, ‘Will anyone stop ISIS?’ CNN, 7 August 2014 Available at 
<http://edition.cnn.com/2014/08/07/world/meast/stopping-isis> (Last accessed 1 June 2016). 
70 BBC, ‘Islamic State: Militants 'kill 300 Yazidi captives'’, 2 May 2015, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-




For example, two separate incidents in the Sinjar province led to the deaths of 80 men in 
the village of Qani and 200 in the village of Kocho.71  
 
 Causing serious bodily or mental harm 
 
The evidence indicated that ISIL used torture to cause bodily and mental harm to their 
victims. According to a UN report, a number of bodies have been discovered that bore 
signs that the individuals concerned had been tortured prior to their deaths.72 Another 
major cause of both physical and mental harm stemmed from the level of sexual violence 
inflicted upon Yezidi women and girls. In addition to the trauma associated with rape, 
reports referred to the administration of beatings by ISIL fighters against Yezidi women 
held as sex slaves.73 As in Rwanda,74 the sexual violence suffered by Yezidi women and 
girls was likely to have lasting psychological effects. Many reports made reference to a 
higher incidence of suicide and attempted suicide. Some of this took place in ISIL captivity 
when Yezidi women and girls were being held as sex slaves.75 Suicides have also been 
reported amongst those who had escaped ISIL captivity.76 One report noted that all those 
who had been held, displayed evidence of ‘acute emotional distress’.77 This violence had 
long-lasting consequences for the women and girls concerned, with some reports making 
reference to victims displaying some symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder.78 Others 
have reported mental harm stemming from witnessing the treatment of other women and 
girls while held as captives by ISIL.79 
 
The above evidence resonates with the experiences of sexual violence victims in 
Rwanda. In one study, victims likened their experiences to those of prostitutes, reflecting 
a sense of shame and loss of dignity.80 Other victims reported being left HIV positive, 
resulting in the destruction of pre-existing marriages.81 
 
 Deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to destroy the group 
 
In Karadžić, the ICTY Trial Chamber recalled that ‘when the same acts are charged under 
Articles 4(2)(b) and 4(2)(c) [of the ICTY Statute], a chamber will consider whether these 
alleged acts amount to conditions calculated to bring about physical destruction only when 
it does not find them to amount to “causing serious bodily or mental harm”.’82 There was 
considerable evidence that ISIL has deliberately inflicted conditions of life calculated to 
destroy the Yezidis through, inter alia: (1) trapping tens of thousands of Yezidis on Mount 
Sinjar without food or water; (2) slavery, rape and sexual violence; and (3) forced religious 
conversions, under pain of death. 
 
(i). Trapping tens of thousands of Yezidis on Mount Sinjar without food or water 
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There was evidence that on 2 - 3 August 2014, tens of thousands of Yezidis from the city 
of Sinjar fled their homes to Mount Sinjar to escape ISIL’s advancing forces.83 ISIL hunted 
and then surrounded the Yezidis as they fled to the mountain ‘with no food and no water.’84 
According to one report, ‘[a]ll sides of the mountain were sealed off by the jihadist militants 
leaving no escape.’85 Up to 40,000 Yezidi men, women and children were trapped on 
Mount. Sinjar, where they were surrounded by ISIL fighters who had threatened them 
with death.86 The mountain provided little shelter, except for some trees and caves, and 
the temperatures exceeded 42 degrees Celsius.87 In such conditions, ‘[m]any women and 
children, as well as the sick and elderly…died on the mountain from hunger and 
dehydration.’88 According to another report, those trapped on the mountain spoke of 
appalling conditions, with no water, food or medicine, and little shelter apart from lone 
trees, under which groups huddled together, or caves dotted in the barren, bleak 
mountainside.89 The condition of the trapped Yezidis was so dire that an international 
coalition had to make emergency airdrops of food and water.90 The UN Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported that: 
 
[e]xposed to extreme heat, dehydration and the imminent threat of attack, people 
there are in desperate need of life-saving assistance, including food, water and 
shelter...Airdrops of food and water are providing some relief, but the situation on 
the mountain remains dire.91 
 
The siege of Mount Sinjar was only lifted following an air campaign against ISIL, which 
was authorized by the US President and which, together with the intervention of Kurdish 
forces, allowed the trapped Yezidis to evacuate.92 
 
(ii). Slavery, rape and sexual violence 
 
The UNHR report found evidence of ‘widespread and systematic enslavement, including 
selling of women, rape, and sexual slavery, forced transfer of women and children and 
inhuman and degrading treatment.’93 Although the precise number of Yezidis taken captive 
was unknown, one estimate had it that ‘as many as 7,000 women were taken captive in 
August 2014.’94 According to the UN Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict, 
ISIL implemented a system whereby: 
 
After attacking a village, IS splits women from men and executes boys and men aged 
14 and over. The women and mothers are separated; girls are stripped naked, tested 
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for virginity and examined for breast size and prettiness. The youngest, and those 
considered the prettiest virgins fetch higher prices and are sent to Raqqa, the IS 
stronghold,” she said. 
 
There is a hierarchy: sheikhs get first choice, then emirs, then fighters. They often 
take three or four girls each and keep them for a month or so, until they grow tired 
of a girl, when she goes back to market. At slave auctions, buyers haggle fiercely, 
driving down prices by disparaging girls as flat-chested or unattractive.95 
 
One incident was particularly telling, as it demonstrated how religious arguments were 
used by ISIL members to dehumanize Yezidi women and girls and to ‘justify’ their 
destruction through slavery: 
 
Along with 24 other girls and young women, the 15-year-old was driven to an army 
base in Iraq. It was there in the parking lot that she heard the word “sabaya” for the 
first time. 
 
“They laughed and jeered at us, saying ‘You are our sabaya.’ I didn’t know what that 
word meant,” she said. Later on, the local Islamic State leader explained it meant 
slave. 
 
“He told us that Taus Maille” - one of seven angels to whom the Yazidis pray –“is not 
God. He said that Taus Malik is the devil and that because you worship the devil, you 
belong to us. We can sell you and use you as we see fit.”96 
 
There was also evidence that many of the women and girls held in captivity were 
repeatedly transferred to different locations in ISIL-controlled territory, ‘with some victims 
transferred to more than 10 different locations during a four-month period. These repeated 
transfers and displacement were apparently aimed at reinforcing ISIL control over the 
victims by instilling feelings of fear, insecurity and disorientation.’97 The Yezidis were 
particularly vulnerable to such repeated transfers because of the strong value that they 
placed on their environment: 
 
[f]or the Yezidis in particular, whose whole way of life is integrated into their religion, 
past and present events are closely linked to each other and to their environment. 
Locations are not only associated with past events, but also imbued with strong 
religious meanings.98 
 
Many of the women and girls were regarded as chattels, imprisoned in houses and held 
in sexual slavery.99 Human Rights Watch has documented a system of organized rape and 
sexual assault, sexual slavery, and forced marriage100 by ISIL forces.101 As with 
enslavement, there was evidence that religious ‘justifications’ had been accepted and 
followed by ISIL members to dehumanize Yezidi victims and rape them. Such a pattern 
emerged in the following cases: 
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In the moments before he raped the 12-year-old girl, the Islamic State fighter took 
the time to explain that what he was about to do was not a sin. Because the preteen 
girl practiced a religion other than Islam, the Quran not only gave him the right to 
rape her -it condoned and encouraged it, he insisted. 
 
He bound her hands and gagged her. Then he knelt beside the bed and prostrated 
himself in prayer before getting on top of her. 
 
When it was over, he knelt to pray again, bookending the rape with acts of religious 
devotion.102 
 
In another case, a 15-year-old girl was raped in similar circumstances: 
 
“Every time that he came to rape me, he would pray,” said F, a 15-year-old girl who 
was captured on the shoulder of Mount Sinjar one year ago and was sold to an Iraqi 
fighter in his 20s. 
 
“He kept telling me this is ibadah,” she said, using a term from Islamic scripture 
meaning worship. 
 
“He said that raping me is his prayer to God…”103 
 
While these acts primarily constituted bodily or mental harm, they could also constitute 
deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about the destruction of the 
group. In Kayishema et al., the ICTR Trial Chamber underscored that ‘the conditions of 
life envisaged include rape.’104 Cherif Bassiouni notes that, under Islamic law, women who 
have had sexual relations outside of marriage are not marriageable.105 Research 
undertaken in the field of gender studies indicates that enslavement, rape and sexual 
violence should be viewed not only as crimes against the individual; they should also be 
viewed as ‘intended to desecrate the ways that members of collectivities - male and female 
- are bound together and thereby to permanently destroy their capacity to rebuild 
themselves as stable and active collective agents in human history.’106 This is because, as 
a consequence of these crimes, familial relationships break down and the victims of these 
crimes become ostracized or lose their ‘marriageable’ status107 and/or refuse to reproduce. 
These insights lead us to ‘recognize something that the perpetrators of genocide have 
known for centuries: that one can destroy a group by destroying that group’s ability to 
reproduce.’108 The Yezidis were particularly vulnerable to this because of the high value 
the Yezidi religion places on endogamy: 
 
[a]ccording to Yezidi customs, marriage with members of other faiths and sexual 
relations outside marriage are not accepted. Such practices are considered to be 
shameful for the whole family, and in the past women and girls believed to have had 
relations with men of other faiths have been victims of so-called “honour killings”.109 
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Although the Yezidi community took measures to reintegrate women victims,110 the 
stigma attached to such women is far-reaching, as evidenced by the testimony provided 
by some of the relatives of abducted Yezidi women and girls interviewed by Amnesty 
International, who expressed concern: 
 
not just about the suffering inflicted on their captured relatives, but also about the 
negative social consequences of the abductions for the future of these women and 
girls. Some said that it would be difficult to find suitable husbands for those who had 
been abducted, even if they had not been victims of sexual violence, because it was 
assumed that all those abducted had been raped.111 
 
(iii). Forced religious conversions, under pain of death 
 
The UNHR report found that ‘[n]umerous Yezidi witnesses provided credible and consistent 
accounts, involving separate incidents and attacks, detailing how they were forced to 
convert to Islam or face death.’112 Forced religious conversions were particularly 
devastating for a religious group such as the Yezidis, particularly given that Yezidi identity 
‘is expressed in terms of religious purity and of difference from other groups.’113 The UNHR 
report went on to observe ‘[s]ome victims and witnesses added that they had been asked 
to convert to Islam and that the men who refused were killed, while in other instances 
even the men who converted were still summarily executed.’114 
 
ISIL implemented a systematic policy of forced conversions of the Yezidis, which was 
described and justified in issues 3 and 4 of Dabiq.  There were numerous testimonies which 
corroborated the findings of the UNHR report above. Many captured Yezidis were forced 
to convert their religion, including in mass ceremonies, or face death.115 The following 
testimony, of a 13-year-old girl who was held captive by ISIL, was particularly telling as 
it exposed ISIL’s underlying goal of destroying the Yezidi religious identity in order to 
supplant its own: 
 
[w]hen they came to select the girls, they would pull them away. The girls would cry 
and faint, they would have to take them by force. They made us convert to Islam 
and we all had to say the shahada [Islamic creed]. They said, “You Yezidis are kufar 
[infidels], you must repeat these words after the leader.” They gathered us all in one 
place and made us repeat after him. After we said the shahada, he said you have 
now been converted to our religion and our religion is the correct one. We didn’t dare 
not say the shahada.116 
 
 Imposing measures intended to prevent births and forcibly transferring 
children 
 
The final two crimes found in Article 2 of the UNCG were linked in the sense that they 
aimed to destroy the future of a group through either the imposition of measures to 
prevent births or the forcible transfer of children away from the group.117 In the first 
instance, measures might include sexual mutilation, the practice of sterilization, forced 
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birth control, separation of the sexes and prohibition of marriages.118 It was also noted in 
Akayesu that the effects of such measures could be mental as well as physical if the person 
affected ‘refuses subsequently to procreate’.119  
 
The transfer of children away from the group sought to ensure that the ‘language, 
traditions and culture of their [original] group become or remain alien to the children.’120 
With respect to the Yezidis, there was evidence that ISIL imposed measures intended to 
prevent births primarily through abortions and systematic rape, and also undertook 
measures to forcibly transfer children. 
 
(i). Abortions and systematic rapes 
 
The UNHR report found evidence that an ISIL doctor ‘conducted abortions on two [Yezidi] 
women in a school in Ba’aj, Ninewa, who were two and three months pregnant, 
respectively… Both women received an injection and were made to take pills.’121 With 
respect to rapes, although falling under Article 2 (b) and (c) of the UNCG, the ICTY Trial 
Chamber held in Karadzic that ‘[t]he systematic rape of women…is in some cases intended 
to transmit a new ethnic identity to the child,’122 thereby preventing births of Yezidi 
descent. Similarly, in Akayesu, the ICTR Trial Chamber held: 
 
[i]n patriarchal societies, where membership of a group is determined by the identity 
of the father, an example of a measure intended to prevent births within a group is 
the case where, during rape, a woman of the said group is deliberately impregnated 
by a man of another group, with the intent to have her give birth to a child who will 
consequently not belong to its mother's group.123 
 
Such measures may be ‘ancillary to a genocidal plan or programme.’124 ISIL’s 
systematic rape of Yezidi women was particularly devastating to the Yezidis on account of 
their deep-rooted religious beliefs in caste and group membership. Membership of a Yezidi 
caste came from both parents and could not be changed.125 On this point, Allison notes: 
 
the borders between Yezidi and non-Yezidi are clearly defined. Birth of Yezidi parents 
is the criterion for membership of the Yezidi community, and Yezidi custom in 
Northern Iraq dictates that if one marries a non-Yezidi one forfeits one’s right to 
membership of the community.126 
 
(ii). Forcible transfer of children 
 
The UNHCR report found evidence, which was corroborated by other sources, that: 
 
[i]n August 2014, following the abduction of thousands of Yezidis by ISIL fighters, 
children aged between eight and 15 were separated from their mothers and 
transferred to different locations in Iraq and Syria, including a school in Tel Afar and 
a school on the outskirts of Raqqa, Syria. Children recounted how they received 
religious and military training following their forced conversion. Training lasted from 
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13 days to three weeks and included how to load and unload guns, shoot using live 
bullets and launch small and medium-sized rockets. Boys reported being forced to 
watch videos of beheadings several times. When they refused, they were severely 
beaten.127 
 
The testimony of one survivor, in particular, served to underscore the forcible nature of 
these transfers of children: 
 
[a]t some point between August 22 and 24 [2014], she said, she watched from the 
prison courtyard as Islamic State fighters took more than 100 boys, some as young 
as 6, from their mothers: 
 
They took the small boys from their mothers. If the mothers refused, they grabbed 
the children by force. They slapped protesting mothers, shot their guns in the air, 
and said, “We’ll kill you if you don’t [let your children go].”128 
 
4. THE MENTAL ELEMENT 
 
In order for the above acts to constitute the underlying acts of genocide, they have to be 
‘intentional or volitional acts,’ and must be accompanied by the necessary mental 
elements.129 In addition, however, the crime of genocide requires the dolus specialis that 
these acts have been committed ‘with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, 
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such.’ Milanovic notes that ‘[i]t is the extreme mens 
rea of genocide which draws the distinction between genocide and crimes [against] 
humanity as a genus.’130 Indeed, even though the mental element may be established 
from circumstantial evidence,131 the probative threshold is usually very high. 
 
The official reports and other sources we examined did not generally identify individual 
perpetrators and we otherwise did not have access to information on the roles played by 
individual perpetrators. For these reasons, we have been unable to reach a conclusive 
view as to whether, in committing the atrocities described in section 3, the individual 
perpetrators possessed the necessary dolus specialis required for the crime of genocide. 
We have limited our analysis to outlining a pattern of conduct which may be indicative of 
the existence of a genocidal plan on the part of ISIL members against the Yezidis.132 
 
In Karadžić, the ICTY Trial Chamber relied on a consistent pattern of conduct 
undertaken by Bosnian Serb Forces in Srebrenica, including the movement of prisoners, 
the vast scale of the executions and the horrendous manner in which they were carried 
out, to infer that ‘[a]ll of these killings were carried out…in circumstances which 
demonstrated clear co-ordination between multiple layers and branches of the Bosnian 
Serb Forces.’133 The Chamber concluded that ‘the only reasonable inference on the basis 
of such evidence is that members of the Bosnian Serb Forces orchestrating this operation 
intended to destroy the Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica as such.’134 While in some cases, 
therefore, international judges have relied on patterns of conduct to infer the mental 
element for genocide, it is acknowledged that assessing whether individual perpetrators 
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acted ‘with the goal or desire to contribute to the (partial) destruction of the targeted 
group’135 (the purpose-based approach) from the actions of a collective entity is near 
impossible, without assessing the particular mental state of the individuals involved.136 
 
In its 2014 report based on over 300 interviews with victims and witnesses, the 
Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Syria concluded that ‘[t]he nature of 
[ISIL’s] attacks on the Yazidis, taken together with ISI[L]’s public statements over social 
media, suggests a denial of this religious group’s right to exist.’137 This view was further 
corroborated in 2015, when the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights’ report found 
evidence ‘point[ing] to the intent of ISIL to destroy the Yezidi as a group…and to the 
existence of a manifest pattern of attacks against this community...’138 This report 
identified ‘a manifest pattern of conduct aimed at the destruction of the [Yezidis]’,139 and 
concluded that ‘[m]embers of ISIL may have perpetrated genocide against the Yezidi 
community by killing, causing serious bodily or mental harm and forcibly transferring 
members of the group, including children.’140 
 
In his remarks, US Secretary of State Kerry noted that, on the basis of a review of the 
information gathered by the US State Department, by the intelligence community, and by 
outside groups, he had reached the view that ‘Daesh is genocidal by self-proclamation, by 
ideology, and by actions – in what it says, what it believes, and what it does.’141 Our 
analysis of ISIL’s pattern of conduct tended to support the above. 
 
The ISIL leadership had made clear its intentions against the Yezidis by issuing a fatwa, 
or religious ruling, that ‘Yazidis should be killed wherever found.’142 This genocidal policy 
against the Yezidis was further corroborated by statements and ‘justifications’ published 
in ISIL’s propaganda magazine, Dabiq.143 In issue 3 of this magazine, a report detailing 
ISIL’s incursions in the north-western regions of Iraq stated: 
 
[s]ome of these regions were inhabited by the devil worshipping Yazīdiyyah. 
Alhamdulillāh, hundreds of them turned to Allah, declared their Islam, and repented 
from their kufr. As for those who insisted upon their shirk, then they fled with the 
Peshmergan [Kurdish] apostates.144 
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In issue 4 of Dabiq, ISIL confirmed that the Yezidis had to be treated as mushrikīn 
(polytheists),145 and it elaborated its religious ‘justification’ for the policy of annihilation, 
rape, sexual slavery and forced conversions of the Yezidis: 
 
[u]pon conquering the region of Sinjar in Wilāyat Nīnawā, the Islamic State faced a 
population of Yazidis, a pagan minority existent for ages in regions of Iraq and Shām. 
Their continual existence to this day is a matter that Muslims should question as they 
will be asked about it on Judgment Day, considering that Allah had revealed Āyat as-
Sayf (the verse of the sword) over 1400 years ago. He ta’ālā said, {And when the 
sacred months have passed, then kill the mushrikīn wherever you find them, and 
capture them, and besiege them, and sit in wait for them at every place of ambush. 
But if they should repent, establish prayer, and give zakah, let them [go] on their 
way. Indeed, Allah is Forgiving and Merciful.} [At-Tawbah: 5].146 
 
This report was unapologetic with respect to the violence that ISIL members have 
committed specifically against the Yezidis as a distinct group, who were further 
differentiated from the Jews and Christians: 
 
[a]ccordingly, the Islamic State dealt with this group [the Yezidis] as the majority of 
fuqahā’ have indicated how mushrikīn should be dealt with. Unlike the Jews and 
Christians, there was no room for jizyah payment. Also, their women could be 
enslaved unlike female apostates who the majority of the fuqahā’ say cannot be 
enslaved and can only be given an ultimatum to repent or face the sword. After 
capture, the Yazidi women and children were then divided according to the Sharī’ah 
amongst the fighters of the Islamic State who participated in the Sinjar operations, 
after one fifth of the slaves were transferred to the Islamic State’s authority to be 
divided as khums… The enslaved Yazidi families are now sold by the Islamic State 
soldiers.147 
 
The report proceeded to provide some of ISIL’s ‘theological justification for sexual 
slaves and how to keep them.’148 This was further expanded on in issue 9, which provided 
another religious ‘justification’ for the sexual enslavement of Yezidi women and other 
women from communities regarded as kufaar (infidels). Following the news of thousands 
of Yezidi women and children being taken into sexual slavery, and the international 
condemnation that ensued, the writer remained unapologetic of, and indeed relished in, 
ISIL’s actions with respect to these women and girls: 
 
… after the kāfir media touched upon the State’s capture of the Yazīdī women… I 
write this while the letters drip of pride. Yes, O religions of kufr altogether, we have 
indeed raided and captured the kāfirah women, and drove them like sheep by the 
edge of the sword.149 
 
The above statements reflected an attempt by ISIL to dehumanize the Yezidis, whom 
they perceived as mushrikīn, and to construct a religious ‘justification’ for the the 
destruction of this group. As outlined in section 3 (above), there was considerable evidence 
that these directions and ‘justifications’ were accepted and carried out in practice. With 
respect to killings, one report found that ‘[a]dolescent boys were told to lift up their shirts, 
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and if they had armpit hair, they were directed to join their older brothers and fathers. In 
village after village, the men and older boys were driven or marched to nearby fields, 
where they were forced to lie down in the dirt and sprayed with automatic fire.’150 This 
suggested that young men were not being killed as potential combatants, which is a 
common defence against genocide charges; the presence of a high number of adolescent 
boys ‘seems to point to an attempt to destroy the ability of the group to organize and 
reproduce itself in the future.’151 
 
With respect to the ‘widespread and systematic enslavement, including selling of 
women, rape, and sexual slavery, forced transfer of women and children and inhuman and 
degrading treatment,’152 the UN Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict 
found that these atrocities were not being committed randomly by individual militants but 
were a key tactic used by ISIL ‘to advance their radical ideology.’153 
 
Another element of this pattern of conduct was ISIL’s system of forced religious 
conversions, under pain of death. This issue has not directly arisen in the jurisprudence of 
the ad hoc Tribunals or the ICC. However, the Group of Experts for Cambodia held that 
the Khmer Rouge’s attacks on the Buddhist monkhood, which constituted a religious 
group, and in particular the Khmer Rouge’s executions of ‘recalcitrant monks’, furnished 
evidence of genocidal intent.154 While, from one perspective, forced conversions could be 
categorized as cultural destruction, rather than physical destruction, it has to be recalled 
that religious faith constitutes the very cohesive force that binds a religious group 
together. ISIL’s systematic forced conversions, under pain of death, of the Yezidis155 were 
intended to strike at the heart of this cohesive force, inflicting conditions calculated to 
destroy this group. Commenting on the psychological violence experienced by the forced 
converts (in the context of the Armenians), one author observes that ‘the dehumanization 
they experienced was inseparable from the erasure of their religious identity.’156 
 
The available evidence also suggested a pattern of abductions of Yezidi children aged 
between eight and 15. Many Yezidi children were separated from their mothers, 
transferred to different locations in Iraq and Syria, forced to convert to ISIL’s interpretation 
of Sharia law and given religious and military training.157 They were forced to watch videos 
of beheadings several times. This pattern pointed towards the goal of destroying the Yezidi 
identity of the abducted children and replacing it with ISIL’s identity, as indicated by what 
one child was told: ‘this is your initiation into jihad, you have to be strong, because you 
will do this when you will go to jihad for the Islamic State; you are an Islamic State boy 
now.’158 In another case, when the older brothers of some of the children asked where the 
children were being taken, an ISIL fighter said, ‘[d]on’t worry, we will feed and take care 
of them. We will take them to a base to teach the Quran, how to fight, and how to be 
jihadis.’159 
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The epithets perpetrators shouted before attacking members of the Yezidi group also 
constitute important indicators of genocidal intent.160 For instance, in the context of the 
killing in Kocho of at least 700 Yezidi men, an ISIL fighter reportedly shouted: ‘you will 
see now what will happen to you, you pagans and peacock worshippers’.161 Moreover, in 
the context of the forcible abortions conducted on two Yezidi women, an ISIL fighter 
reportedly stated: ‘we do not want more Yezidis to be born.’162 And in the context of a 
mass ceremony relating to the forced marriage of about 60 Yezidi female captives, ISIL 
fighters told the group to ‘forget about your relatives, from now on you will marry us, bear 
our children, God will convert you to Islam and you will pray.’163  
 
Finally, in committing these atrocities, ISIL appeared to discriminate specifically against 
the Yezidis, as compared to members of other minority groups, such as Christians, whom 
it viewed as ‘People of the Book’. In issue 4 of Dabiq, ISIL articulated a religious 
‘justification’ for discriminating between the Yezidis, on the one hand, and Jews and 
Christians, on the other. According to that ‘justification,’ whereas the ‘People of the Book’ 
could be given the option of paying jizyah (tax), in the case of Yezidis, ‘there was no room 
for jizyah payment.’164 Moreover, according to one report, ISIL’s sex trade appeared ‘to 
be based solely on enslaving women and girls from the Yazidi minority. As yet, there has 
been no widespread campaign aimed at enslaving women from other religious 
minorities.’165 In this respect, one incident was especially telling: 
 
In Kojo, one of the southernmost villages on Mount Sinjar and among the farthest 
away from escape, residents decided to stay, believing they would be treated as the 
Christians of Mosul had months earlier. On Aug.15, 2014, the Islamic State ordered 
the residents to report to a school in the center of town. 
 
When she got there, 40-year-old Aishan Ali Saleh found a community elder 
negotiating with the Islamic State, asking if they could be allowed to hand over their 
money and gold in return for safe passage. 
 
The fighters initially agreed and laid out a blanket, where Ms. Saleh placed her heart-
shaped pendant and her gold rings, while the men left crumpled bills. 
 
Instead of letting them go, the fighters began shoving the men outside, bound for 
death. 
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In the course of this analysis, we have found a consistent and coordinated pattern of 
atrocities committed by ISIL members against the Yezidis. While this pattern seemed to 
indicate the existence of genocidal intent within ISIL ranks, in view of the limitations of 
our sources and, in particular, the lack of access to information on individual perpetrators, 
we have not been able to reach a view on whether individuals perpetrators had the dolus 
specialis necessary to commit the crime of genocide. In this context, we have had to limit 
ourselves to outlining a pattern of conduct which could indicate a genocidal plan. 
 
We concur with the US Secretary of State Kerry’s remarks that, ultimately, the full 
facts of, inter alia, the Yezidi’s plight should ‘be brought to light by an independent 
investigation and through formal legal determination made by a competent court or 
tribunal.’167 In its legal characterisation of ISIL’s violence, the prosecutor(s) of such a court 
or tribunal should be wary of trying to circumvent the probative difficulties associated with 
specific intent by charging only war crimes and/or crimes against humanity. We consider 
that, subject to the evidence and depending on the circumstances of each case, ISIL’s acts 
should also be characterized as the crime of genocide. It is only then that ISIL’s atrocities 
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